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Abstract: An important aspect of the Future Internet is the efficient utiliza-
tion of (wireless) network resources. In order for the - demanding in terms of
QoS - Future Internet services to be provided, the current trend is evolving
towards an “integrated” wireless network access model that enables users to en-
joy mobility, seamless access and high quality of service in an all-IP network
on an “Anytime, Anywhere” basis. The term “integrated” is used to denote
that the Future Internet wireless “last mile” is expected to comprise multiple
heterogeneous geographically coexisting wireless networks, each having different
capacity and coverage radius. The efficient management of the wireless access
network resources is crucial due to their scarcity that renders wireless access a
potential bottleneck for the provision of high quality services. In this paper we
propose an auction mechanism for allocating the bandwidth of such a network
so that efficiency is attained, i.e. social welfare is maximized. In particular, we
propose an incentive-compatible, efficient auction-based mechanism of low com-
putational complexity. We define a repeated game to address user utilities and
incentives issues. Subsequently, we extend this mechanism so that it can also
accommodate multicast sessions. We also analyze the computational complex-
ity and message overhead of the proposed mechanism. We then show how user
bids can be replaced from weights generated by the network and transform the
auction to a cooperative mechanism capable of prioritizing certain classes of ser-
vices and emulating DiffServ and time-of-day pricing schemes. The theoretical
analysis is complemented by simulations that assess the proposed mechanisms
properties and performance. We finally provide some concluding remarks and
directions for future research.
Key-words: Heterogeneous wireless networks, bandwidth allocation, auction
theory
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Mécanismes d’allocation de bande passante basés
sur les enchères pour les réseaux sans fil du futur
Résumé : Un aspect clé de l’Internet du futur sera la gestion efficace des
ressources et spécifiquement des ressources sans fil. Nous évoluons actuellement
vers des réseaux d’accès sans fil intégrés qui doivent permettre la mobilité des
utilisateurs, un accès transparent et une certaine qualité de service. Le terme
"intégré signifie que les derniers sauts sans fil de l’Internet du futur compren-
dront plusieurs réseaux sans fil ayant des capacités et des zones de couverture
hétérogènes. La gestion efficace des ressources de ces réseaux d’accès sans fil
est cruciale étant donnée la limitation des ressources radios. Dans cet arti-
cle, nous proposons un mécanisme basé sur la notion d’enchères pour allouer
de la bande passante dans de tels réseaux. Avec ce mécanisme, l’efficacité est
atteinte, i.e. le bien-être social est maximisé. Nous définissons une suite de
tels jeux afin de prendre en compte les problèmes d’utilité des utilisateurs et
d’incitation. Enfin, nous étendons ce mécanisme aux sessions multicast. Nous
analysons aussi la complexité en calcul et les surcoût en terme de messages des
mécanismes proposés. Enfin, nous montrons comment transformer l’enchère en
un mécanisme coopératif capable de prioritiser certaines classes de services en
remplaçant les paris des utilisateurs par des poids générés par le réseau. Pour
finir, des simulations de ces mécanismes sont proposées.
Mots-clés : rśeaux sans fil hétérogènes, allocation de bande passante, enchèresc
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1 Introduction
An important aspect of the Future Internet is the efficient utilization of (wire-
less) network resources. In order for the - demanding in terms of QoS - Future
Internet services to be provided, the current trend is evolving towards an “in-
tegrated” wireless network access model that enables users to enjoy mobility,
seamless access and high quality of service in an all-IP network on an “Any-
time, Anywhere” basis. The term “integrated” is used to denote that the Future
Internet wireless “last mile” is expected to comprise multiple heterogeneous ge-
ographically coexisting wireless networks, each having different capacity and
coverage radius [1]. This integrated wireless network access approach has been
also motivated by the 3G cellular mobile networks and their potential enhance-
ment with WLAN radio access, and also WiMax, which can utilize the analogue
TV bands (700 MHz) that will be made available with the upcoming roll out of
digital TV. Thus, integrated wireless network access can comprise the means of
providing wireless Future Internet services to possibly mobile users.
Figure 1: Co-existing wireless access networks.
In this paper we propose, analyze and assess an auction-based mechanism for
allocating the downlink bandwidth of such a Wireless Future Internet network
whose access architecture is hierarchical in terms of radius and thus geographical
coverage. In particular, we consider a single network provider who owns and
thus controls such a wireless access infrastructure, as the one depicted in Fig. 1;
we address the problem of deciding on which user flows to admit and how the
downlink bandwidth of the “integrated” access network should be allocated to
the competing user services so that efficiency is attained, i.e. social welfare is
maximized. Social welfare is defined as the sum of all users utilities and is a
widely used and commonly accepted maximization goal which depicts - as its
name indicates - the society’s attained welfare from the adoption of a certain
scheme.
We propose an auction mechanism, applicable in Wireless Future Internet
hierarchical networks, comprising of multiple tiers of wide, middle and local
area access networks owned by one operator. Due to the hierarchical structure
of the network, depicted as Fig. 1, each user can be served by means of either a
higher tier network of that area, or by some lower tier network (e.g. a WLAN).
The standard assumption that user terminals are capable of accessing multiple
network interfaces is made. Our model is motivated by the 4G integrated access
model and the fact that wireless operators invest in WLANs as a cheaper means
of providing high speed download services compared to other technologies such
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as HSDPA [2]. Finally, terminals capable of connecting to multiple network
interfaces are available in the market [3].
We then extend the proposed mechanism so as to support multicast. Mul-
ticast is a very promising technology that enables the efficient transmission of
only one copy of data to a group of receivers. This is very useful for the wire-
less networks where due to the exponentially increasing demand for high-speed
Future Internet data services and the scarcity of the wireless spectrum, it is
imperative to utilize the network efficiently.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains an
overview of related work. In Section 3 we present the proposed auction mecha-
nism and its properties. We extend our mechanism in Section 4 so as to support
multicast. Section 5 studies utility definition and user incentives issues in a re-
peated game comprising of consecutive auctions. In Section 6 we transform the
auction mechanism to a cooperative mechanism capable of prioritizing services
and emulating DiffServ and time-of-day pricing schemes. Section 7 assesses our
mechanism’s computational complexity. Section 8 complements the analysis of
the proposed mechanism by means of simulations. Finally, Section 9 provides
some concluding remarks and interesting directions for future research.
2 Related Work
A plethora of architectures, protocols, resource management and handoff schemes
for 4G and Wireless Future Internet have been proposed in the literature (see
[1], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8] and references therein). Those proposals generally lack
economic merit, since they do not prioritize users in terms of their utility for
the service, as opposed to our approach. In fact, most of them are complements
to our scheme, since they provide the technological solutions by means of which
our scheme can be applied. Thus, we henceforth restrict attention to similar
economic-aware schemes.
Hierarchical bandwidth allocation has been studied in [9], where in the top
tier a unique seller allocates bandwidth to intermediate providers (e.g. Internet
Service Providers), who in turn resale their assigned shares of bandwidth to
their own end customers in the lowest tier. This model involves resale among
the 3 tiers pertaining to different actors, as opposed to our case where a single
actor owns multiple tiers and aims to efficiently allocate their bandwidth.
A utility-based load balancing scheme in WLAN/UMTS networks is pro-
posed in [10]. For each network, a utility reflecting the current load is computed.
The values of the network utilities, i.e. loads, are communicated to the clients
who can switch to the less loaded network. Thus, this scheme cannot prioritize
users in terms of their utilities.
Closest related to our work is the scheme of [11], where fixed rate pipes over
two alternative paths are auctioned among synchronized users having different
utilities for the two paths and thus submitting different bids. The latter contra-
dicts the seamless access concept, as opposed to our work. Also, the scheme of
[11] cannot be generalized for multiple services, rates and networks, as opposed
to our scheme. Finally, the computational complexity of the mechanism of [11]
exceeds that of our scheme, mostly due to the fact that different utility values
per user are assigned to each path.
INRIA
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3 The Proposed Auction
Users compete for downlink data services, such as FTP, video and audio stream-
ing over a Future Wireless Internet access network depicted as Fig. 1. Each
service flow is shaped by the network operator in a similar way with the 3G
networks, i.e. by means of token buckets [12]. The use of token buckets allows
an accurate description - and shaping/policing - of the load injected by the
various flows over the network and thus a precise estimate of the multiplexing
capabilities of the network under various loads. Therefore, in our model differ-
ent services si, sj ∈ S may differ only in terms of their respective mean rates
mi 6= mj .
We propose a sealed-bid auction, run periodically for allocating bandwidth
over a given period of time, i.e. users are synchronized. Dynamic user arrivals
and departures may occur at the various auctions; this is discussed in Section 5.
Each user i ∈ I has a certain utility ui and declares a willingness to pay wi
for a service of rate mi, by submitting wi as part of his service request. Let pi
denote the per unit of bandwidth willingness to pay of user i, i.e. pi = wi/mi.
For an L−tier network architecture, let C(l)k denote the capacity of the l-
tier access network k, with l = 1, .., L; i.e. l = 1 corresponds to the network
technology having the greatest geographical coverage. k is the index of the l-
tier network accessible by the user, e.g. the index/ESSID of a WLAN inside the
coverage of which the user is located.
Users are both unaware of and unable to control the internal routing of their
traffic. However, since assigning a possibly mobile user to a network interface
of low geographical coverage is expected to result to higher number of handoffs
for that user over time, our scheme attempts to assign high value users to
the network interface with the highest radius. Thus, the declaration of a high
willingness to pay from a user also implicitly results in a lower expected number
of handoffs. This comprises an additional attractive feature of the proposed
mechanism.
Upon a service request is received, the operator1 creates the bids b(l)i =
(pi,mi) ∀i ∈ I, l = 1, .., L and updates the respective active bids sets B
(l)
k for
all networks k accessible by the user, one per tier. The basic idea is that winner
determination is performed starting from the highest coverage network, where
competition is most fierce. The users bids are sorted by pi and given the capacity
constraint, the highest of them are declared as winning. The auction winners are
propagated to the lower tier network auctions, from which their bids are deleted.
Winner determination is then performed for the next tier, until the lowest tier
is reached; this is done simultaneously, in a distributed fashion for same-tier
networks. A sample auction execution for a two-tier network comprising of
a 3G network and three WLANs is provided as Fig. 2; in order to keep the
presentation of the auction simple, there is no top-tier WiMax or LTE interface
in this simplified example.
The proposed auction is defined as follows:
1The terms network and operator are used interchangeably in the remainder of the paper
to refer to the owner of the network, who is also the auctioneer.
RR n° 7188
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Step 0
Set l = 1. Sort(B(l)k ) ∀k, l // sort bids per pi.
Step 1
Determine winning bids W(l)k of the l-tier network k to be the largest set of the
highest bids of B(l)k that do not violate the capacity constraint C
(l)
k .
Step 2
For every user i having bid bi ∈ W
(i)
k delete user i’s bids from B
(j)
k , ∀j > l. Set
l = l + 1.
Step 3
If (l < L) goto Step 1.
Step 4
Compute payments.
Figure 2: Sample algorithm execution for a UMTS/WLAN network. Different
colors denote the different WLANs that users can utilize, depending on their
location.
3.1 Incentive compatibility and efficiency
The payment rule of the auction (Step 4) should enforce truthful bidding, i.e.
wi = ui ∀i ∈ I, so that the available network resources can be assigned to the
users that value them the most and thus social welfare is maximized. A strong
result of auction theory is that the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism,
is the essentially unique mechanism where it is dominant strategy for the bid-
ders to bid truthfully, the outcome maximizes social welfare and bidders having
zero valuations attain zero benefit [13]. Note that the term “essentially unique”
INRIA
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implies that any auction mechanism that has the same outcome with this gen-
eralized Vickrey auction is essentially an equivalent specification of the VCG
mechanism.
This mandates that besides awarding the items auctioned to the highest
positive bids submitted by the users, we need to apply the VCG payment rule.
The latter defines each user’s charge to be the social opportunity cost that his
presence entails. Formally, user i is charged:
SW−i(0, θ−i)− SW−i(θ) (1)
SW−i denotes the social welfare of bidders other than i, θ is the set of the
users’ reported valuations and (0, θ−i) is the efficient outcome if i’s reported
value were 0 and the other users’ reports remain unchanged. More intuitively,
each user’s charge equals the losing bids that would be winning in the auction if
his own bid were set to 0. This amount is both unaffected by and less than the
user’s own bid. In general, this rule requires that in order to compute the charge
of every winner in the auction, the auction must be rerun by removing this user
from the auction, so that his charge can be computed from 1. This is a tedious
procedure, resulting in the general case in NP computational complexity.
However, our mechanism takes advantage of its hierarchical structure: Note
that all user bids are propagated to the upper tiers so that winner determination
is performed and then the winners are propagated downstream so that the
auction proceeds at the lower tiers. A similar upstream update can be made
for the users that will win in the lower tiers. That is, the winning bids of
the l + 1,..,L-tier auctions are deleted from the local losing bids index of a l-
tier auction. Thus, the information required to determine the “global” social
opportunity cost is available locally per auction. Hence, each winner’s i charge
is computed as the sum of the highest (locally stored) losing bids whose sum of
rates equals mi and there is no need to rerun the auction; we elaborate more
on this in Section 7.
Proposition 1: The proposed auction is efficient.
Proof: By construction, our auction examines all the bids at the top tier and
admits the highest. This is repeated for all tiers, making impossible not to ad-
mit a bid that is higher than those admitted. Since users bid truthfully due to
the VCG payment rule, i.e. wi = ui, and the highest bids are admitted, social
welfare is maximized. Thus, efficiency is attained, and after the algorithm ter-
minates it is impossible for a winning bid to be lower than a losing bid.
3.2 Revenue
Since our mechanism is essentially a VCG auction, it attains the highest revenue
among all efficient mechanisms [13].
4 Supporting Multicast
In this section, we extend the auction of Section 3 so as to support multicast. In
particular, our auction is complemented with the operator’s decision on whether
a user is served by means of unicast or multicast. Hence, this is decided by
the operator as a network optimization decision, opaque to the users. Thus,
RR n° 7188
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it is not part of the user’s strategy space to choose between a unicast or a
multicast service session. From a technological point of view, a multicast group
is beneficial for the network, provided that it has at least n(l) members. This is
due to the signaling overhead of the multicast, which depends on the underlying
network technology.
The operator constructs the multicast bids M(l)k that complement the uni-
cast bids B(l)k in the auction by grouping together at least n
(l) users requesting
the same service, e.g. watching a video at a certain quality. Let g ∈ G be
a multicast group. The multicast bid is straightforwardly defined as (pg,mg),
where pg =
∑
i∈g pi and mg = mi.
Proposition 2: It is beneficial for the network and harmless for the users
of a multicast group to have their unicast bids deleted.
Proof: Since n(l) > 1, and pg =
∑
i∈g pi > pi, ∀i ∈ g, a multicast bid always
tops its members’ unicast bids, thus having strictly higher probability of win-
ning. Also, since mg = mi <
∑
i∈g mi, ∀i ∈ g, it is always socially efficient to
serve users by means of multicast when the n(l) constraint is met, since more
users can be served by the network.
Due to Proposition 2, auction winner determination is performed as follows:
The operator deletes the “redundant” unicast bids of the users belonging to
some multicast group. He then mergesorts the unicast and multicast bids and
declares the largest set of the highest bids that do not violate the capacity
constraint as winning. Therefore, the same algorithm of Section 3 is applied
to declare the winning unicast and multicast group bids, denoted as W(l)k and
WM
(l)
k respectively.
Proposition 3: Social welfare is maximized.
Proof: Efficiency is attained, since users bid truthfully, i.e. wi = ui, and after
the algorithm terminates it is impossible for a winning bid to be lower than any
kind of losing bid:
bw > bi ∀bw ∈ W
(l)
k , ∀bi /∈ W
(l)
k (2)
bg > bi ∀bg ∈ WM
(l)
k , ∀bi /∈ WM
(l)
k (3)
bw > bg ∀bw ∈ W
(l)
k , ∀bg /∈ WM
(l)
k (4)
bg > bi ∀bg ∈ WM
(l)
k , ∀bi /∈ W
(l)
k (5)
5 Time, User Utility and Incentives
Defining the user utility for receiving service in a certain time interval is non-
trivial, especially for long-lived services where the consistent reservation of re-
sources in subsequent auctions is highly beneficial. This is for instance the case
for a long-lived real-time streaming video service; clearly losing at some auction
will result in loss of content and dis-satisfaction for the user and thus to a re-
duced willingness to pay for the entire service. Hence, user utility may depend on
the history of resource allocations. History-dependent utility functions capable
INRIA
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of expressing such preferences have been have originally been proposed in [14]
for auction-based resource allocation in UMTS networks and subsequently used
elsewhere [15, 16]. The main merit of history-dependent utility functions is that
multiple quality parameters such as the vector of instantaneous bit rates, delay
and/or total quantity of resources allocated impact the values of the correlated
marginal utilities and the overall expected level of users’ satisfaction. We use
the term “marginal utility” to denote the additional utility attained over each
slot of the user’s service session. Thus, these utility functions can accurately
quantify the time-varying user-perceived quality. These could complement our
scheme by using them to compute the value of wi to be submitted at time t, as
a function of the user’s utility for the long-lived service and the history of user’s
allocations so far.
Note also that a small value for the length of time for which the auction
allocations apply, allows our scheme to quickly adapt to the varying demand.
However, it also implies that the auction is run more often. Thus, this value
should be large enough for the auction to run between two consecutive allocation
intervals. This obviously depends on the complexity of the auction, which is
derived in Section 7.
We now briefly address the issue of user incentives for this repeated game,
depicted as Fig. 3, where users bid in a sequence of auctions. Node START
denotes user’s i start of bidding and in general each node (state) corresponds to
the bidding phase of each auction he participates. At each node user i selects
an action, i.e. to bid truthfully be = wi, or shade his bid bl < wi, or bid
aggressively bm > wi. We denote the corresponding bidding strategies as Se, Sl
and Sm respectively.
Figure 3: The sequential form of the repeated game for 3 auctions.
Incentive compatibility still holds if user bids for independent services at the
various auctions. Since the user utility is additive, so is the expected payoff from
the game, thus EP =
∑T
t=1EPt. In order to maximize this sum, it suffices to
maximize all the EPt. However, EPt = Pr(win)·(uj−SocialOpportunityCost).
Since the SocialOpportunityCost is unaffected by customer’s own bids and the
probability of winning is maximized if bj = uj, so are EPt and EP . This means
that incentive compatibility is bidders’ dominant strategy for the aforemen-
tioned game. Thus, since it is best for bidder always to follow strategy Se, the
realization probabilities vector for the strategies < Sl, Se, Sm > is < 0, 1, 0 >.
Note that this is not just a Nash equilibrium strategy, it is dominant strat-
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egy and subgame perfect (always best to reveal with his bid his true valuation,
regardless of the node of the tree of the game where he is located).
We now address the most interesting case where complementarities exist
among the user allocations in subsequent auctions. In this case, wining at one
of a series of auctions brings in addition to the value ui an extra net benefit
by increasing the value of future allocations; this is because losing at some
auction for a user e.g. of a video service would result in lower value for the
whole of the service due to the incurred service interrupt. Thus, the question
is whether strategy Sm or a mixed strategy comprising of the strategies Se and
Sm, could result in higher expected payoff than Se. This might be indeed the
case if the bid be is at some auction slightly lower than the cutoff price and a
bid bm brings extra value (due to service continuation) higher than the extra
charge paid, that he would lose if bidding be. However, this would not be the
case for extremely “uncertainty averse” (conservative) users, who - by definition
- in cases of choice/behavior under uncertainty always opt to play the safest
strategy. Therefore, for this type of users truthful bidding comprises a subgame
perfect equilibrium strategy. This “maximin” behavior was proposed by Wald
[17] for situations of severe uncertainty, which is also encountered by the bidders
in our auction.
6 Cooperative Schemes
In this section we show how the proposed mechanism can be transformed to a
cooperative bandwidth allocation mechanism for operators who prefer flat rate
pricing to usage based pricing schemes. In this context, the user utility for the
service wi∀i is replaced by a predefined weight ws that the operator assigns to
each type of service s. This modification suffices to modify the auction to a
cooperative bandwidth allocation scheme. Note that under this modification,
determining the payments of the winners is performed instantly, i.e. in O(1).
Due to the different weights assigned per service type, this scheme prioritizes
the services having greater weights. These services will enjoy statistically higher
quality than others and this scheme serves essentially as a DiffServ mechanism.
Also, the operator can assign different weights per time of day in the various
services. This way, in peak hours he may discourage demanding services by
assigning a low weight, and also emulate time-of-day pricing.
Furthermore, weights can be dynamically computed from weighting func-
tions per flow, so that each weight takes into account the flow’s overall service
time to prioritize older flows, emulating schemes like CHiPS [18] where the
winner of an auction is prioritized compared with new flows.
Last but not least, it is also possible to modify the mechanism so that it can
perform well-known scheduling policies such as Round Robin and First Come
First Served. Indeed, in order to do so it suffices to define each flow’s weight
to be equal to the inverse of the assigned share of resources and the inverse of
the time of the flow initiation respectively. Obviously, these scheduling policies
are not economic-aware and thus it is impossible for them to outperform the
auction in terms of the attained social welfare.
This comprises further evidence that the proposed mechanism is flexible
enough to be tailored and customized to various resource allocation policies that
the network operator may wish to employ. This is also an attractive feature of
INRIA
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our mechanism since it can be envisioned that in a Wireless Future Internet
network architecture, it would be both possible and desirable for a provider
to be able to employ different such policies over a certain part of his network
capacity, thus applying both richer and more sophisticated resource allocation
policies.
7 Assessment
Having assessed our mechanism in economic terms, by taking into advantage
the fact that our mechanism is essentially a VCG mechanism, we proceed to
assess its computational complexity.
7.1 Auction Complexity
Sorting the bids of each link auction is done in O(N ·logN), with N denoting the
total number of bids. Winner determination is then done in O(N), so that the
point where the capacity constraint is violated is found. Computing winners’
charge exploits the fact that user rates are not arbitrary but pertain to discrete
service rates: First, we compute the charge for all service rates by adding the
highest losing bids whose sum of rates equals this rate. Then each winner is
charged his respective service charge. This is bounded by O(s · N), with s
denoting the number of different service rates. Deletion of bids can be done in
O(N · logN) since finding each bid can be done in O(logN) using binary search
and this must be performed for at most N bids. Since same-tier auctions run
in parallel, while different tier auctions sequentially, the mechanism’s overall
complexity is bounded by O(L · (N + s ·N +N · logN)).
7.2 Multicast Extension Complexity
The additional overhead of the multicast extension is due to creating multicast
bids and deleting redundant unicast bids. The former can be performed by
parsing once the sorted list of bids and classify the users to separate groups,
based on their selection of service, for which the total numbers of users and
willingness to pay are updated as the list is constructed. This is done in O(N),
withN denoting the total number of bids. Subsequently, each redundant unicast
bid must be deleted. Finding each bid can be done in O(logN) using binary
search. Since at mostN bids must be deleted, the complexity bound of multicast
is O(N +N · logN).
8 Simulations
In this section we assess experimentally various aspects of the proposed auction
by means of simulations. We have implemented the proposed mechanism as
a Java application. We have run numerous simulation experiments according
to a detailed simulation model, specifying the distributions of user arrivals,
departures, and service requests, and the mix of users in terms of the number of
users per service requested and the distribution of their total willingness to pay.
For each user, the total willingness to pay is randomly selected according to a
uniform distribution over an interval which is determined by whether the user
RR n° 7188
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is of low, medium or high value. The simulation is run for a series of T auctions
where a number of users bid; their service start time ts is drawn from a uniform
distribution having support in [1, T ] and duration are also drawn uniformly
from [1, T − ts]. The total quantity of resource units available at each auction
also fluctuates (due to the varying resources available) in the simulation model,
and is randomly selected according to a uniform distribution. The capacities
for the networks used in the simulations run typically match that of standard
network interfaces, i.e. WiMax, 3G HSPA and WLAN networks. Finally, the
user services used for the simulations are CBR streaming video of low quality
(Video-LQ) of 1 Mbps, video of high quality (Video-HQ) of 5 Mbps and FTP
of 1 Mbps.
For brevity reasons, rather than describing in detail the various simulations
conducted, we present the main findings and provide some illustrative examples.
8.1 Service completion and handoffs
Adopting an auction mechanism comprising of a series of auctions for resource
allocation in consecutive time periods may affect considerably the resource al-
location pattern for a long-lived service. For instance, if a user is forced to
participate in 50 auctions in order to receive a video service, it is possible that
the service is interrupted at some auctions if the user’s bid is not high enough.
This is inevitable due to the varying competition, however it is desirable that
this does not occur often. Indeed, if it is common for users to experience ser-
vice interrupts, they would be displeased and the applicability of the proposed
auction would be limited. In fact, this is a typical argument in favor of non
economic-aware scheduling policies such as FCFS that do not exhibit this prob-
lem.
We have run various simulations in order to assess the percentage of the
total resources that users receive when bidding in a series of auctions. Our
simulations indicate that due to the hierarchical form of the network and its
large multiplexing capacity, the proposed auction typically serves users in a
satisfactory way. Indeed, the percentage of users that receive mediocre service
is limited, while the vast majority of users is either served perfectly or not served
at all.
We provide as Fig. 4 the percentage of users service completion for a series
of 500 auctions and a network comprising of 1 wide area network of 500 Mbps,
2 medium area networks of 50 Mbps and 10 local area networks of 6 Mbps,
each of which serves 40 FTP users with medium willingness to pay, 40 Video-
LQ users with medium willingness to pay and 40 Video-HQ users with medium
willingness to pay. Note that due to the fact that the willingness to pay of the
users is drawn from the same interval of uniform distribution and due to the
dynamic arrivals and departures over time, this is the least favorable scenario
for the proposed auction, since users with higher willingness to pay are likely to
arrive and displace some customers that already receive service. However, the
auction performs very well. Note that in order to make the plot more readable,
we plot the percentages of the 740 users that won at least in one auction; the
remaining 460 of the total 1200 users had bids that were always under the
auction cut-off price and were never served.
It is also worth emphasizing that this performance may be further improved
by adopting a scheme that prioritizes users that have already won at past auc-
INRIA
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Figure 4: Service completion percentages for the auction bidders.
tions as opposed to new arrivals, such as CHiPS [18]; simulating and assessing
such schemes in the context of our auction comprises an interesting direction of
future research.
Finally, we comment on the number of handoffs users experienced through-
out their service time. In the simulation set up described above, users never
experienced more than one handoff throughout their service time, as depicted
also in Fig. 5. A handoff is defined in our context as a change in the serving
network interface of a user in two consecutive auctions within his service time.
Note that we do not measure as handoff a switch in the serving network after a
service interrupt, though this typically happens in the simulations run, since this
does not result in additional complexity for the network. From the simulations
run, it is concluded that the maximum number of handoffs depends heavily
on the relation of the network interfaces - and especially those of the lowest
geographical coverage - capacity and the rate of the user services; the higher
the multiplexing capacity of the networks, the higher the number of handoffs
experienced.
8.2 Speed of execution
We have conducted many simulations in order to assess the major factors that
affect the speed of the auction execution. These simulations indicate that the
dominant factor that determines the speed of execution is the number of end
customers participating. The way these customers are distributed or the number
of networks where these customers can be assigned to have a second order impact
compared to the total number of bidders. The impact of the capacity of the
networks comprising the hierarchical network access is negligible.
In particular, one set of simulations conducted comprises of 100 simulations
for a 3-tier network where there is one wide-range network of capacity 500 Mbps;
within its coverage there are two networks of capacity 50 Mbps and 4 networks
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Figure 5: Number of handoffs experienced by the users.
of 10 Mbps. The auction was run and its execution time was measured in a
laptop with AMD Turion TL50 processor with 1 GB DDR2 running Windows
XP. The average execution time of T = 100 consecutive auctions and 120 users
was 2374 msec. The measured execution time was 15485 msec for 600 users and
39487 msec for 1200 users.
This example depicts both the impact of the number of users in the total
execution time but also the limited time required to run the auction in practice:
the execution of one instance of the auction, which would be the case in a real
network, can be typically done in an order of magnitude of msecs or few seconds.
This is further evidence of the proposed auction’s applicability in practice.
8.3 Revenue and social welfare
It is no surprise that the auction revenue and social welfare depends on the re-
lationship between demand and supply. This is true for all auction mechanism
and also applies to the proposed mechanism as well. Indeed, in the simulation
conducted it has been observed that the most fierce the competition, the higher
the attained revenue and the closer it is to the social welfare attained. Though
the revenue and social welfare values should be computed for the entire “hier-
archical” auction, we provide some indicative plots. These plots indicate that
the revenue and social welfare values among networks of the same tier are quite
similar. This is due to the uniform way we generate demand and distribute it
to the end tier networks. Also, due to the way the auction is run and the higher
capacity of the higher tier networks both the social welfare and revenue values
for these interfaces are considerably higher.
Below, we provide some indicative plots, namely Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, that
depict the distribution of demand, supply, social welfare and attained revenue
for a series of 100 auctions for a hierarchical network comprising of 1 wide area
network of 500 Mbps, 2 medium area networks of 50 Mbps and 8 local area
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networks of 6 Mbps, each of which serves 50 FTP users with high willingness
to pay, 50 Video-LQ users with low willingness to pay and 50 Video-HQ users
with medium willingness to pay.
Figure 6: Demand and supply distribution among the network interfaces.
Figure 7: Revenue and Social Welfare plots.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a mechanism for the allocation of the downlink
bandwidth of a Wireless Future Internet network, whose access architecture is
hierarchical in terms of radius and thus geographical coverage. In particular, we
have designed an incentive-compatible auction mechanism of low computational
complexity. We have extended the mechanism so that multicast is supported,
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defined a repeated game to study utility and incentives issues and transformed
our auction to a cooperative scheme for services prioritization. We have assessed
the proposed mechanism in economic, game-theoretic and complexity terms and
its effectiveness by means of simulations. Both the theoretical and the experi-
mental analysis indicate that the mechanism specified in this paper is efficient,
fast and an attractive means of economic-aware resource allocation. Defining
weighting functions for emulating DiffServ and CHiPS with our cooperative
mechanism comprises interesting direction of future research.
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